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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

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
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TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda



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
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ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

MOSCOW NOTES DAYAN'S U.S. VISIT, TROOP DISENGAGEMENT TALKS

Moscow has offered virtually no comment on the progress or prospects of the troop disengagement talks in Geneva, although brief TASS dispatches have reported the sessions of the military working group. In general references to the Geneva peace conference, Moscow has continued to project the posture of guarded optimism it assumed when the talks began. At the same time, continuing TASS reportage on cease-fire violations has portrayed Israel as responsible for the exchanges of fire and has stressed that such actions by no means contribute to success in the peace conference.

Soviet coverage of Israeli Defense Minister Dayan's 4-5 January talks in Washington noted that he held discussions with Secretary Kissinger on the Geneva conference, and particularly on the question of troop disengagement, and that he also met with Defense Secretary Schlesinger "to press for more deliveries" of U.S. weaponry. In an Arabic-language commentary on the 8th, Moscow said Dayan's quest for more weapons, taken in conjunction with Congressional approval last month of the U.S. foreign aid bill providing \$2.2 billion emergency aid to Israel, raised doubts in Arab minds about the "so-called American peace line." Peace, Moscow said, has never been insured by granting the "aggressors" more and more money to strengthen their military capability. Claiming that Arab papers were describing the U.S. attitude toward the Mideast problem as "two-faced," the broadcast concluded that only time would tell whether the United States would Israel to abstain from its "old delaying tactics" regarding a settlement. PRAVDA on the 6th, citing Cairo papers, said that while Israel had used the elections as a pretext for delay at Geneva, it could no longer use the excuse of a lack of authority to adopt responsible decisions since Mrs Meir's party remained in power.

TROOP DISENGAGEMENT TASS on the 5th, in reporting Dayan's Washington discussions on principles of troop disengagement, provided a brief outline of Israeli and Egyptian positions on the issue on the basis of U.S. and Egyptian press accounts. It cited the Washington POST as saying that the main obstacle in the Geneva talks was the question of the kind of forces that Egypt should be permitted to retain on the east bank of the canal, with Israel maintaining that they should be lightly armed police-type forces, and Egypt insisting that this was no

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legitimate concern of Israel. TASS also reported Cairo papers as stressing Egypt's view that a troop disengagement agreement should contain provisions for further withdrawals and should prepare the way for full implementation of Security Council Resolution 242.

Repeating this Egyptian contention, a Cairo dispatch in PRAVDA on the 6th said that Egypt, directing its efforts to this end, had submitted a number of proposals in the Geneva sessions of the working group that aim at reducing tension in the Middle East and opening up "extensive possibilities" for further moves on a settlement. PRAVDA referred to a UN buffer force in citing AL-AHRAM to the effect that an agreement on disengagement should incorporate guarantees that the situation would not be stalemated once "UN troops are deployed in positions between the Egyptian and Israeli troops."

PALESTINIAN ROLE
IN CONFERENCE

Moscow's Arabic-language service on the 6th reported without comment that Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi had met with Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leaders to discuss progress made in the military working group. Attributing the report to AL-AHRAM, Moscow said the paper added that Egypt supported the idea of PLO participation in the Geneva conference on the grounds that a final Middle East settlement should include restoration of the Palestinians' legitimate rights. The following day a Moscow Arabic-language broadcast quoted the Beirut AN-NAHAR as saying that Fahmi, after his meeting with the PLO leaders, had said that Egypt supported the establishment of a Palestinian government in exile before the second stage of the Geneva conference began.

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U S S R - E G Y P T

PRAVDA CONCERNED BY SIGNS OF "CAPITALIST TENDENCIES" IN EGYPT

Moscow has again come out with criticism of "private capitalist tendencies" in Egypt and made a strong pitch for the state sector of its economy. This step comes against a background of Western news reports and indications in the Cairo press of an impending Egyptian Government reshuffle and an economic program that would relax some socialist policies. A PRAVDA article on 7 January by the paper's Cairo correspondent, Yuriy Glukhov, hailed the commissioning of the first stage of the Helwan metallurgical complex, "being built with Soviet assistance," and pointed out that without "such a mighty base as the state sector," constituting the base of Egypt's industry, the country could not have withstood the struggle against "imperialist intrigues." The strengthening of this base, Glukhov argued, means strengthening the positions of an independent, progressive Egypt.

Similar suggestions of Soviet disquiet over economic trends in Egypt had appeared in PRAVDA articles by Demchenko in February and July last year. The latter article, pegged to Egypt's revolution anniversary, conveyed concern over a growing trend in Egypt to encourage private enterprise, with attendant "negative social consequences."

Now Glukhov has noted that Egypt's internal development is not proceeding without a struggle. Private capitalist tendencies are being manifested, he said, complaining that the construction boom in the private sector did not cease even during the October war. Glukhov disapprovingly noted that "speculative elements" had revived since the abolition of import licenses, and he made clear Soviet dissatisfaction with the idea of "free zones" by his remarks that the Egyptian private sector was placing its hopes in the planned creation of "'zones of free capital investment' to which Arab and foreign capital would be attracted on preferential terms."

Glukhov painted a dismal picture of shortcomings in Egypt's private enterprise, in contrast with the benefits derived from the state sector. The Helwan combine, he said, towered over the small-scale plants with their "primitive tools and low labor productivity" and "continuing grave situation of the workers." He glowingly described the benefits for workers in state enterprises, such as free medical treatment, social security, housing, and training centers. And he quoted AL-JUMHURIYAH--an advocate of strengthening the public sector--as declaring that the Helwan complex "visibly confirms the correctness of the course of social development we have chosen, that of socialist development, based on the public sector of the economy."

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EUROPE

MOSCOW ASSAILS PROPOSALS FOR WEST EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION

The evolving West European interest in closer defense cooperation has attracted increasing critical attention from Moscow in recent months. In a series of press and radio comments pegged to various West European statements and actions promoting this goal, Moscow has sought to portray the West European effort as reflecting a revival of cold war attitudes, and as inconsistent with the goal of all-European cooperation embodied in the CSCE negotiations. A major article by Yuriy Zhukov in the 25 December issue of PRAVDA is the latest entry in this campaign. Because of its authoritativeness and its unusually caustic tone, it marks an upgrading of Moscow's campaign against West European defense cooperation--from a sniping action to a frontal assault.

Adopting a frankly polemical tone and employing his characteristic talent for heavy irony, Zhukov stresses the continuity between the current European moves for defense cooperation and the ill-fated EDC proposal of 1954. Asserting that the earlier proposal was the product of men who dreamed of resurrecting the "Holy Roman Empire," he suggests that the present moves for European defense cooperation were prompted by the heirs of these men and similarly are out of step with the times. He heaps scorn on the assertion allegedly made at the recent November session of the WEU that the EDC failed only because it was "premature."

The issue, as Zhukov presents it, is between those who base their plans for security on a concept of "Little Europe" and those who place their trust in the broader scheme of all-European cooperation held out by the CSCE. Not surprisingly, in arguing for the latter, he makes a virtually open appeal to Gaullist sentiment. Recalling the scene in the French National Assembly when the EDC proposal was defeated, Zhukov emphasizes the dramatic impact made by the then ill Herriot in a speech opposing the EDC. "The European Community means the end of France!" Herriot is quoted as having said. This viewpoint, according to Zhukov, was shared by the majority of thinking Frenchmen, "among them General de Gaulle."

To underscore the point, Zhukov raises the bugbear of a nuclear-armed West Germany. Noting that Strauss, the FRG's "inveterate opponent of detente," was a major spokesman for the creation of a nuclear force under West European control, Zhukov cites the

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London FINANCIAL TIMES to the effect that the fate of detente would look "very gloomy" if the West Germans gained access to nuclear arms. Reiterating his appeal to French sentiment, Zhukov recalls that Premier Messmer had rejected such a joint West European nuclear force precisely because of the problems involved in controlling it, and that President Pompidou had "clearly made known" that France "prefers to remain the sole master of its armed forces."

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

SPEAKERS AT PRAGUE CONCLAVE CALL FOR NEW WORLD CONFERENCE

Moscow's quest for a new international conference of communist parties gathered momentum in direct appeals for such a gathering registered by high-ranking East European party figures at the 8 January session of a conference in Prague dealing with the journal PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM.

Czechoslovak party Presidium member and secretary Vasil Bilak underscored the need "to begin preparing a new international conference" of communist parties, and SED Politburo member and secretary Hermann Axen declared that his party shared the view of "a number of fraternal parties" that the need for a new conference "is maturing." Axen prefaced his appeal for a world gathering with an endorsement of a conference of European communist parties "toward the end of the year"--implying that the broader world party conference may be planned for 1975, as recently surmised by the Yugoslavs. Both Bilak and Axen included strong attacks on the Chinese leaders in their speeches, and both justified their calls for a new conference on the thesis that the tasks set by the 1969 Moscow conference had been "fulfilled."

The issue of a new conference had been broached more cautiously by CPSU delegate Ponomarev in his speech at the opening of the Prague gathering on the 7th. As reported by TASS, Ponomarev merely noted a "growing" interest in "multilateral meetings" of the communist parties, arising from the need for "coordinating actions" in the world movement. Moscow has so far refrained from any public endorsement of the new conference proposal on its own authority, confining itself instead to Soviet media reports of such appeals by foreign communist leaders, beginning with that by West German DKP chairman Herbert Mies, reported by PRAVDA and NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on 3 November. PRAVDA on 7 December reported further calls for a conference by Hungary's Kadar and Bulgaria's Zhivkov.

Bilak, Axen, and Ponomarev were all delegates to the 18-19 December Moscow conference of CP secretaries on "ideological cooperation," where the world conference proposal was presumably on the agenda. The communique on that meeting, apparently in deference to the stand of the Romanian delegation, had avoided any mention of either the 1969 gathering or the projected new world conference.

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On 25 December IZVESTIYA had carried an article by another delegate to the Moscow CP secretaries conference, Polish party Secretariat member Ryszard Frelek, which also called for a new world party conclave. In the article, keyed to the Soviet peace program, Frelek declared that the "full acceptance" of that program by the foreign communist parties was the reason why "the question now arises" of convening a new world conference. Prefacing these remarks with an attack on "the Maoists," Frelek went on to state that such a conference was needed "to develop further" the program adopted at the 1969 Moscow conference and to "strengthen still further the ideological unity" of communist ranks.

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

PEKING HARSHLY INDICTS SOVIET "SUPPRESSION" OF DISSIDENTS

Peking's most sweeping indictment of Soviet policy toward domestic dissidents in recent years, highlighting reports of continued resistance to the Brezhnev leadership, is contained in a lengthy NCNA commentary of 8 January. Although the commentary does not refer specifically to Soviet author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's "Gulag Archipelago," recently published in the West and now under mounting fire from Soviet commentators, it seems timed to capitalize on acute Soviet sensitivity to this book's charges of internal repression. Peking had carried similar attacks on Moscow's handling of Russian dissidents during the height of the Sino-Soviet polemics in the 1960's, but has generally avoided this subject since the Sino-Soviet border talks began in 1969. Taken together with Peking's recently heavy outpouring of criticism on other sensitive Sino-Soviet issues such as the Taiwan question and the border problem, the new NCNA commentary indicates a measured hardening of Peking's attitude toward Moscow.*

The present commentary was published in PEOPLE'S DAILY of 8 January according to Western reports, but has been carried so far without authorship attribution by NCNA's domestic Chinese and international English transmissions, and similarly broadcast on Peking radio's main domestic newscasts.

The commentary sharply rebuts Brezhnev's claim of harmonious domestic order in the USSR, charging that the "Soviet revisionist renegade clique" has been able to maintain itself only by establishing repressive laws, new labor camps and insane asylums for political prisoners, and expanded police and surveillance networks. Arguing that there are presently over 1,000 work camps with one million prisoners in the USSR, the bulk of whom are political offenders against the Soviet regime, the article charged that Moscow has frequently been forced to call out troops and heavily armored units in order to maintain its control by means of

* A 24 December broadcast to Taiwan, for example, strongly asserted that Moscow "eyes socialist China with extreme hostility" and that it has deployed a million troops along China's border in an attempt to some day "devour" China. For a discussion of earlier charges, see the TRENDS of 28 December 1973, pages 11-12.

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"bloody suppression of the Soviet people who have risen in rebellion." Pointing to numerous reports of strikes, demonstrations, and other forms of resistance by workers, minorities, and intellectuals, the article took the opportunity to laud those who oppose Moscow's "anti-China crimes" and its policy of domination in East Europe.

The current commentary gave Soviet intellectuals' resistance secondary treatment in favor of opposition by workers and minorities. Peking's only other recent direct reference to Soviet repression of intellectuals came in a 31 December PEOPLE'S DAILY article, which accused Moscow of using "high-handed" policies to deal with the resistance of intellectuals and other dissidents.

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EAST - WEST RELATIONS

MOSCOW CALLS SOLZHENITSYN BOOK AN ATTEMPT TO HALT DETENTE

Moscow has gradually broadened the scope of its attacks on Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's "Gulag Archipelago," from TASS wire service commentaries to foreign radio broadcasts and finally to commentaries on domestic radio and television. The role of the central press in the campaign has thus far been limited to reprinting critical comment by foreign communist papers. The campaign has thus not yet reached the stage of last summer's media campaign against Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn in which the two men were directly denounced in the central press in articles and letters of protest following their provocative interviews with foreign correspondents in Moscow.*

The thrust of the commentary has been to depict Solzhenitsyn as a pathological enemy of the Soviet system and to discredit the work by highlighting his alleged sympathies with the tsarist regime, Nazi Germany during World War II, and South African racism. The comment aimed at foreign audiences has acknowledged the disclosures in Solzhenitsyn's book about a "country-wide secret service network" and "camps of the postwar years," but domestic comment has referred only to "slanders on our social system."

Following a pattern established in last summer's campaign, Moscow has charged that the book is actually aimed at impeding East-West detente, citing the timing of its publication and the publicity accorded it by "the masterminds of reactionary propaganda" in the West. Typifying this approach, a Pavel Kuznetsov commentary broadcast to Great Britain and North America on 7 January noted that the book has keynoted "a new wave of anti-Sovietism" in the West. A commentary by Viktor Kupriyanov, broadcast to Great Britain on the 8th, likewise cited a NEWSWEEK headline which called the widespread publicity for the book in the West "a new kind of cold war."

* Moscow's handling of the events last summer is discussed in the TRENDS of 6 September 1973, pages 17-18, and 12 September, pages 12-14.

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A commentary by Dmitriy Morozov broadcast in West European languages on 3 January charged that publication of the book in the West violates "Soviet law and international conventions." But Moscow has not pressed this charge in subsequent comment, nor has it given any further hint at what action it might take in response. Indeed, Moscow may see some advantage in limiting its response in view of the adverse Western reaction to last summer's press campaign against Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn. On the other hand, the book's direct challenge to the regime's domestic policies, and the fact that Soviet listeners can now learn about its contents from Western radio broadcasts, may outweigh other considerations bearing on the official reaction.

Comment has touched only briefly on the implications of the book's publication for the sensitive information and cultural exchange issues at the CSCE talks in Geneva. Anatoliy Potapov, in a domestic radio and TV commentary on 4 January, implied that a limited Moscow reaction might be desirable by intimating that Western opponents of detente were hoping for a Soviet response which might impede the CSCE. Such opponents, he argued, "would like to show that cultural exchange is allegedly not possible."

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INDOCHINA

DRV, PRG SPOKESMEN PROTEST REMARKS BY SCHLESINGER, THIEU

Defense Secretary Schlesinger's 6 January remarks in a television interview on the prospect of renewed U.S. bombing in Vietnam in the event of a communist offensive prompted the usual Vietnamese communist protests in foreign ministry spokesmen statements and press and radio comment. The reaction to the defense secretary's remarks coincided with Vietnamese communist comment accusing GVN President Thieu of exposing his "bellicosity" in recent speeches--on 28 December at Vung Tau and on 4 January at Can Tho. Predictably, the spokesmen's statements and attendant media comment have linked the Thieu and Schlesinger remarks to give an impression of collusion between the United States and Saigon to mount "new military adventures" in Vietnam.

The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, issued on 8 January, castigated Schlesinger for "arrogantly threatening" that it was "highly likely" Nixon would ask congressional approval to use U.S. aircraft against North Vietnam to support Saigon "if North Vietnam launched an all-out offensive against the South." Seeing this "threat" as evidence of U.S. encouragement and assistance for Saigon military adventures and sabotage of the Paris agreement, the spokesman asserted that these remarks came at a time when Thieu had declared that "there will be no peace or general elections in South Vietnam, that the negotiations with the communists might be called off, and that the Saigon armed forces should intensify their offensives in communist-controlled areas." The 8 January PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement gave its primary attention to these statements attributed to Thieu, and charged that he had spoken "with an extremely rough-mannered attitude" and "uttered slanderous statements against the NFLSV, the PRG, and the DRV government."

The latest foreign ministry spokesmen statements are consistent with several similar protests in the past six months responding to Schlesinger speculation about the possibility of resumed U.S. bombing. For example, PRG and DRV foreign ministry spokesmen statements on 25 and 26 June protesting alleged Saigon cease-fire violations assailed Schlesinger for having said on 18 June that he would not rule out a resumption of the bombing. Remarks by Schlesinger on the same subject on 17 August drew a DRV--but no PRG--Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the following day that was more strident than the current statements. However, spokesmen statements issued by the DRV and PRG on 1 and 3 December, respectively, denouncing Schlesinger's 30 November press conference remarks on the possibility of renewed U.S. intervention, closely paralleled the most recent statements

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 31 DECEMBER 1973 - 6 JANUARY 1974

| <u>Moscow (2504 items)</u> | | | <u>Peking (942 items)</u> | | |
|--|------|-----|--|-------|-----|
| Cuban Revolution 15th Anniversary | (1%) | 10% | Domestic Issues | (60%) | 55% |
| CPSU Central Committee Appeal on 5-Year Plan | (--) | 7% | New Year's Day Joint Editorial | (--) | 10% |
| Brezhnev New Year's Speech to Soviet People | (--) | 6% | Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira in PRC | (--) | 7%* |
| China | (5%) | 5% | Indochina | (6%) | 4% |
| Middle East | (6%) | 3% | Middle East | (4%) | 3% |
| Attacks on Solzhenitsyn | (--) | 2% | | | |

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* Reports on the Ohira-Mao meeting totaled some 24 rebroadcasts but are not included in this figure because of their brevity.